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ABSTRACT
This article presents a normative critique of the coherence of 
democracy promotion in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
As an immanent critique, the paper derives its normative standards 
internally from an analysis of key ENP policy documents. It is argued 
that democracy promotion is in conflict with some of the other goals of 
the ENP such as market liberalisation, trade policy reforms and private 
sector development. Further, the incentive of market integration is 
argued to undermine democracy promotion. Though the ENP’s 
current way of pursuing the goal of democratisation is normatively 
incoherent, this article also argues that incentivising democratisation 
through conditionality is not inherently contradictory. Two 
potential ways democratisation could be coherently promoted are 
suggested: delimiting the policy to unilateral transfers conditional on 
democratisation alone (‘simple transfers’), or offering EU membership 
to ENP countries (‘no integration without incorporation’).
1. Introduction
This paper critically examines the values that the European Union professes drive its rela-
tionships with countries in its ‘neighbourhood’, with particular attention to the notion of 
democracy promotion through economic conditionality in the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Using the method of immanent critique all the ENP regional 
progress reports, ENP strategy papers and implementation reports from the proposal of the 
policy in 2003 to Spring 2015 were studied, as well as the two pieces of legislation regulating 
the financial instruments. The objective was to identify the standards and values of ENP 
democracy promotion, in order then to critique ENP democracy promotion on its own terms. 
The paper argues that ENP democracy promotion is incoherent because the goal of democ-
racy promotion is at odds with other ENP goals and because the incentives the ENP offer 
undermine democratisation.
The promise of enlargement used to be the principal way in which the EU attempted to 
steer neighbouring countries in the direction of desired reforms, including democratisation 
(Schimmelfennig 2005; Smith 2005). Through successive waves of enlargement from 1973 
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to 2013, the EU managed to incentivise reforms in countries in its periphery. Since the turn 
of the millennium, however, EU member states have experienced ‘enlargement fatigue’ (e.g. 
Schimmelfennig 2008). There were fears that decision-making in the European Union would 
become difficult with more member states. Others worried that including poorer states to 
Europe’s east would weaken the Union (Edwards 2008).
The ENP, proposed in 2003, saw neighbourhood countries as ‘neighbours’ with little 
chance of incorporating fully into the Union (Joenniemi 2008, 2012). It has replaced EU 
membership with wealth transfers and access to EU markets as ‘carrots’ to incentivise political 
reform; political conditionality has thus largely been replaced by economic conditionality. 
Such policies, sometimes called ‘external governance’ or ‘governance beyond borders’, influ-
ence how some academics consider the boundaries of the EU to have become ‘fuzzy’ (e.g. 
Zielonka 2007, 152) even, while full EU membership remains limited to a relatively small 
circle. Others, however, argue that the ENP sharpens divisions between insiders and outsiders 
(Zaiotti 2007).
One avenue of scholarship has tested the degree to which the ENP has been able to 
replicate the successes of reforms associated with enlargement, with the general consensus 
being that it has failed in this regard (e.g. Edwards 2008; Schimmelfennig 2008). A general 
consensus holds that the incentives offered by the ENP are insufficient in comparison to the 
incentive of membership (Dimitrovova 2012). This paper suggests another reason why the 
ENP may have failed to promote democracy: a normative tension between conditionality 
and democracy promotion. This tension existed in enlargement politics also but, I will argue, 
was mediated by membership.
2. Method
This paper develops an immanent critique of democracy promotion in the ENP, adapting a 
methodology developed by Nicolaïdis (2013). The main research question asks whether the 
ENP is normatively coherent with the values it professes to hold in the context of democracy 
promotion. I argue that that the ENP is incoherent with the values it professes to hold because 
it’s economic and trade agenda undermines democratisation.
Part of the critical theory tradition, immanent critique aims at discovering the tensions 
and contradictions internal to a political practice. In our case, the standards arise from the 
legitimation discourse the EU produces to justify democracy promotion efforts.1 Once iden-
tified, the various emerging standards are juxtaposed to see if they are complementary, or 
rather if there are ways in which they undermine one another. This two-step process is what 
Nicolaidïs describes as ‘discerning evolving aspirations, tensions and contradictions within 
this world observed’ (2013, 357). It enables a normative theorist to draw, again in her words, 
on ‘the deep texture of European history, law and politics’ (ibid.), while keeping the normative 
standards invoked relevant to real politics.
Some may retort that normatively framed discourse should be taken with a pinch of salt 
as it often serves as a mask for self-interested behaviour. A recurrent theme in EU studies 
has been to unmask a hidden ‘realist’ agenda grounded in self-interest behind the lofty 
rhetoric that frames the ENP (e.g. Youngs 2004; Smith 2005; Hyde-Price 2006, 2008; Haukkala 
2008; Seeberg 2009). As a work of political theory, this paper replicates neither that agenda, 
nor directly the agenda of examining the ‘success’ of the ENP in achieving EU policy ambi-
tions. Instead, the normative contradiction shows how the ENP in its current form can only 
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ever be partially successful; the tension this paper reveals explains why success in promoting 
democracy will risk undermining success in other domains.2 Contrariwise, success in pro-
moting other objectives is often in conflict with the goal of promoting democracy, although 
it is argued that enlargement policies were an exception to this rule.
The first part of the paper considers the justificatory discourse surrounding the ENP, draw-
ing out the concepts of democracy and conditionality from that discourse. In part two, it is 
argued that two tensions arise from this discourse. First, the goal of democracy promotion 
is in conflict with some of the other goals of the ENP such as market liberalisation, trade 
policy reforms and private sector development. This argument builds on scholarship that 
explores the internal consistency of the ENP, particularly in relation to the risks of democracy 
promotion undermining (short-term) stability (Seeberg 2009; Börzel & van Hüllen 2014). It 
differs from these critiques, however, in focusing on the consistency between the ENP’s 
normative goals and economic objectives. The way that the EU incentivises ENP goals is also 
argued to be in conflict with democracy promotion. The core problem here lies with the fact 
that one type of incentive – the liberalisation of trade relations through privileged access to 
EU markets – comes with options-diminishing conditions attached.
The extent to which countries in the European Neighbourhood live up to any set of 
democratic standards varies. The goal of democracy promotion has most sense when we 
consider EU relations with countries that are not considered (full) democracies. Only in that 
context can the EU attempt to bring about democratic reform. The arguments put forward 
in this paper therefore only apply to those countries that are not considered (full) 
democracies.
Although the ENP’s current way of promoting democracy is normatively incoherent, this 
paper also argues that incentivising democratisation through conditionality is not inherently 
contradictory. Two potential ways in democratisation could be coherently promoted are 
suggested. The first requires that two conditions are met: (1) economic benefits offered are 
limited to unilateral transfers of benefits; (2) democratisation policies avoid pursuing other, 
substantive goals. The second way to promote democracy coherently in the ENP would 
require membership to be offered as an incentive, as it was under enlargement politics. A 
third option of resolving the tension, not pursuing democratisation through the ENP, is not 
discussed at length, but has been suggested (Seeberg 2009; Dimitrovova 2012).
It is important to state from the outset the motivation of this study. Some may argue that 
democracy promotion is but one, relatively minor aspect of the ENP. Historically speaking, 
they would not be wrong. Nevertheless, over the course of the ENP emphases on its dem-
ocratic credentials have intensified, thus warranting specific attention. Further, the normative 
incoherence this article charges the ENP with amounts to more than mere hypocrisy. If the 
pursuit of other goals by the ENP inhibits partner countries from deciding their own policies 
in an autonomous, democratic fashion, then these disparate strands of the ENP cannot both 
be successful – the goal of trade liberalisation and market reform comes at the expense of 
democracy promotion.
2.1. What democracy? Exploring the basis for an immanent critique
Since the goal is to demonstrate that the there is a normative contradiction internal to the 
ENP, the relevant normative standards must be drawn from the ENP itself, not externally. 
That is not to say that the ENP has developed a unique approach to democratisation. On the 
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contrary, the conception of democracy that the ENP adopts is closely related to OSCE, ODIHR 
and Venice Commission standards (Casier 2011). Still, in keeping with the methodological 
requirements of an immanent critique, it is important to pay close attention to the detail 
and evolution of the concept of democracy in ENP documents.
Democracy is bundled with other goals right from the start, sometimes in ways that make 
it difficult to separate out the different ends analytically. For instance, the first ENP financial 
instrument bundles ‘crises or threats to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fun-
damental freedoms’ (Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 art. 7.5); similarly, the 2008 progress 
report demands that Belarus ‘takes concrete and convincing steps towards democratisation, 
respect for human rights and the rule of law’ if it wishes to enjoy ‘a full partnership’ (3). The 
second financial instrument puts it as follows: ‘the Union offers European Neighbourhood 
countries a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to, and promotion 
of, the values of democracy and human rights, the rule of law, good governance and the 
principles of a market economy and sustainable and inclusive development’ (Regulation 
(EU) No 232/2014, preamble 3).
This bundling indicates that the ENP documents tend to support the notion that the kind 
of democracy the EU wants to promote is ‘liberal democracy’. This is not to say that the EU 
has a monolithic and developed view of what democracy is. Indeed, as Kurki and others 
have pointed out, one aspect of EU democracy promotion that is unusual is that the EU has 
not actively defined democracy (2015, 35, 36). It is also important not to make the mistake 
of assuming that ‘liberal democracy’ is so vague a category that it applies to all extant democ-
racies. Many commentators have remarked that recent developments in Poland and Hungary 
suggest that they are – or are becoming – non-liberal democracies. Wetzel and Orbie have 
addressed this complexity by dividing up democracy promotion efforts between those sup-
porting what they call the ‘partial regimes’ of democracy and those supporting the ‘external 
conditions’, supposed to support or stabilise democratic regimes. They warn, however, that 
‘promotion of the external conditions alone does not necessarily further democratization’ 
(2015, 7, see also Youngs 2009).
Further evidence that ENP democracy promotion aims to promote liberal democracy can 
be seem in the way that ENP documents report that progress is made towards democratic 
reform goals when reforms address liberal political rights and progress towards liberal insti-
tutions. The 2013 strategy paper for instance states that, though ‘democratic elections were 
held in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia; concerns remain about the freedom of assembly, association 
and expression, including the freedom of the media, in most partners’ (6). In a similar vein, 
the 2007 progress report lists Armenian reforms related to the separation of powers under 
‘reforms to strengthen their democratic institutions’ (3).
In response to the events of the Arab Spring, the EU developed its notion of democracy 
to see what could be done to further democratisation in the Mediterranean region , although 
it has been criticised also for remaining too much on the sidelines in practice (Schumacher 
2011). The 2011 revision of the ENP develops and evolves the notion of democracy through 
the idea of ‘deep and sustainable’ democracy (2011b, 1, 2, 3). This is taken up in later docu-
ments, and thus serves as a foundation for analysing ENP democracy (2013a, 2014a; 
Regulation (EU) No 232/2014). It is worth quoting the paragraph where it is first introduced 
in full:
several elements are common to building deep and sustainable democracy and require 
a strong and lasting commitment on the part of governments. They include:– free and fair 
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elections;– freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media;– the 
rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial;– fighting against 
corruption;– security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the estab-
lishment of democratic control over armed and security forces. (2011b, 3)
It is clear that ‘deep and sustainable’ democracy can be well understood in the light of the 
notion of liberal democratic principles. Most of the elements common to liberal democracy 
are part of this formulation of ENP democratisation: the division of power, judicial independ-
ence, representative democracy, individual political rights (voting, standing for office, free-
dom of speech), collective political rights (association, including in labour unions and political 
parties). Kurki reminds us, however, that since there is no definitive conception of democracy 
used in EU democracy promotion it is important not to construct too rigid an ideal-type 
(2015).
Completing this liberal account of democracy is the requirement that democratic pro-
cesses promote political pluralism. The 2012 regional report for Southern partners states 
that ‘successful completion and the implementation of constitutional reform and the holding 
of free and fair elections will be the key to the emergence of a pluralistic political order’ (p. 
8, see also 2003, 2009). The 2011 strategy paper ‘A New Response to a Changing 
Neighbourhood’ is still more explicit with this regard:
Another challenge is to facilitate the emergence of democratic political parties that represent 
the broad spectrum of the views and approaches present in society so that they can compete 
for power and popular support. This challenge of fostering civil society and pluralism is felt 
throughout the neighbourhood. (p. 4, also 2003, 2009; 2011b, 2013b)
As well as liberal, however, ‘fuzzy’, most ENP discourse evaluated focuses more on democratic 
institutions than on civil society or a democratic culture.3 This is surprising given that civil 
society support takes an important place in the policy documents of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. One explanation for the relative lack of attention civil society receives in ENP 
progress reports is the intergovernmental bias of the partnership agreements. In the line 
with this understanding, ENP policy documents speak of ‘democratically elected’ parliaments, 
(2003, 15, also 2008, 2009; 2013a, 2013b) and indicate that ‘institutions’ (2008, 3, also 2013a, 
2013b), ‘practice’ (2009, 11) and a ‘form of government’ (2004, 4) can and ought to be dem-
ocratic. This broadly liberal, institutional idea of democracy is dominant particularly since 
the 2011 revision.
The liberal democratic conception of democracy that ENP policy documents use empha-
sise the notion of ‘political control’ by citizens as an end of democracy promotion (2008, 3 
also, 2011b, 2013a). This is a recurrent theme, also in the context of citizen control over 
security and armed forces (2011b, 3, 2013a). The ENP thus considers that it is not enough to 
have democratic practices combined with the guarantee of liberal rights; it seems that dem-
ocratic outcomes are also required by the ENP. Tom Casier recognises this binary in play in 
his study of ENP democracy promotion in the Ukraine, following Pridham’s distinction 
between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ democracy (Casier 2011). This interplay is a crucial point 
for this paper, since it is a loss of democratic control concurrent to implementing certain 
ENP goals and incentives on which the normative contradiction this paper formulates is 
based.
The ENP is based on values supposed to be shared between the EU and partner countries. 
Despite a discursive commitment to the ‘co-authorship’, however, it is clear that EU demo-
cratic practices serve as the model for democratic norms (Zaiotti 2007; Joenniemi 2008). 
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Some scholars describe this in colonial, postcolonial or neo-colonial terms, even describing 
the ENP as a European ‘civilising mission’ (e.g. Dimitrovova 2012). ENP policy documents 
show that an idealised notion of EU democracy is taken as the standard with which to meas-
ure democratisation in neighbourhood states.
Although ENP discourse goes out of its way to claim ‘joint’ and ‘shared’ commitments to 
democracy (2010, 3, also 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2014a) there is an ambivalent relationship to 
non-European style democratisation. This can be seen in how the events of the Arab Spring 
are reported. The 2013 regional report for Southern neighbours puts it as follows:
In 2013, the unstable political situation and growing social unrest based on people’s demands for 
dignity, democracy, respect for human rights and inclusive economic growth strongly affected 
the performance of the Southern Mediterranean governments in implementing reforms. 
Complex domestic and international challenges constrained the implementation of the agreed 
road maps and achievement of the set objectives.
Here, it seems that, indirectly, ‘people’s demands … for democracy’ constrained the imple-
mentation of ENP reforms. Less starkly but in the same vein, the previous year’s report stated: 
‘the electoral victory of parties inspired by Islam triggered open debates within institutions 
and civil society on the role of Islam in the new democratic set up’ (2013b, 2). As a result, 
‘transition governments faced the need to build a political consensus on democratic reform, 
limiting their ability to take decisive steps towards reforms’ (ibid., my emphasis). It seems clear 
that only democratic developments that meet the standards of an idealised liberal democ-
racy loosely modelled on EU practices are recognised and praised in the ENP.
2.2. Spitting in the wind: contradictory goals
Regarding the way in which the EU pursued its policies of assuring political goals through 
the common market, the ENP was problematically ambidextrous from the outset. On the 
one hand, the policy was formulated in order to promote economic cooperation, including 
access to the EU common market. On the other, it sought to promote democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law on EU terms. These twin goals were taken to be complementary 
in the pursuit of ‘a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood’ (2003, 4).
The ENP aimed at ‘promoting reform’ in the neighbourhood on several fronts simultane-
ously. The goal of democracy promotion, however, conflicts with some of the other goals. 
Democratic institutions, as the ENP understands them, are the proper context for a demos 
to exercise its right of self-determination through allowing citizen control of the state, includ-
ing over the policies of the democratically elected and accountable government of that 
state. The question then arises whether the EU’s pursuit of specific market reforms through 
the ENP limit democratic peoples from exercising these rights, or, less strongly, if this pursuit 
is contrary to the goal of supporting a pluralistic democratic environment.
Is it really the case that economic and market reforms are considered as goals of the ENP? 
The evidence is somewhat mixed. Usually, economic conditionality is seen as a tool for 
encouraging reform in other areas, centrally democracy promotion, the rule of law and 
human rights (the normative tensions of which are explored later in this section). Economic 
incentives are supposed to ‘support’ EU-desired reform agendas (2011a, 5, also 2011b, 2012b), 
thus aligning with the idealised notion that these reform agendas originate in the partners. 
Nevertheless, at several points it is clear that economic objectives are also specific goals of 
the ENP. One of these instances has already been quoted above – the 2011 regional report 
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on the Eastern Partnership strikingly seems to put reforms of democracy, human rights and 
rule of law reforms at the service of economic reforms (2012a, 2). The 2011 joint communi-
cation ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’ also seems to imply economic 
reform is an end in itself – albeit in a less radical fashion:
In the medium to long term, the common objective … is the establishment of Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas … They should form part of a broader comprehensive package 
in support of democratic and economic reforms. Negotiations should be started with countries 
that are clearly engaged in such a process of political and economic transformation. (p. 9 my 
emphases)
In this communication, ‘clear engagement’ with economic transformation even seems a 
prerequisite for the ‘package of support’. Finally, the 2011 regional report for the Southern 
neighbours says the partnership ‘focuses on three elements’ for reform, listing ‘sustainable 
and inclusive (economic) growth’ as the third element, while the 2013 strategy paper states 
that ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas – (are) key instruments in support of dem-
ocratic and economic transformation’ (15). Further evidence to this conclusion can be found 
in the frequent reference made in country progress reports to the extent to which partners 
have adopted the acquis communautaire.
Given the goal of promoting liberal democracies, understood in line with the notion 
defined in part one, the concurrent promotion of substantive economic goals is contradic-
tory. In a liberal democracy, commitment to particular economic models, including in trade 
relations, ought to properly be determined either by those representatives elected to leg-
islate or by those in government with a democratic mandate to pursue international trade 
policy on behalf of the state in question. Deciding on such matters will include adjudicating 
between contrasting interests and a plurality of views on, inter alia, social justice, desert and 
the ends of political association. Such a reading of the requirements of liberal democracy 
has traction in ENP discourse, for instance, the emphasis on the need for political 
pluralism.
Whereas democratic institutions and procedures intend to arbitrate between these com-
peting interests and views, the imposition of an externally determined agenda for reform, 
as can be seen above, is in conflict with democratic control. While some actors in the neigh-
bouring countries in question may welcome this reform agenda, it is likely that others will 
oppose it – especially given the high initial costs of liberalisation observed in countries 
liberalising their economies in order to accede to the EU (Zielonka 2007).
The problem is thus not that economic reforms are imposed on neighbourhood peoples 
without taking into account the will of their political principals (though we return to this 
point below). Bear in mind that the 2010 strategy paper gives a warning specifically denying 
this:
The ENP does not seek to export the EU acquis wholesale. However, with only a few regulatory 
models in a globalised world, the EU model tends to be attractive to partners, reducing the 
‘invention costs’ of political and economic costs of reform. Thus many partners have adopted a 
broad-ranged approach to convergence with EU policies and regulatory standards. (6)
However, even if we take this claim at face value, the fact of the matter is that many countries 
with which these free trade and association agreements are signed are not initially democratic, 
or not wholly so, certainly not on the ENP standards of democracy.
In any case, it is often clear that regulatory convergence with the EU is an EU policy 
objective in the ENP, in contrast with the above statement. This can be seen, for instance, in 
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the 2011 report for Southern partners which lists as an objective that ‘New generation Action 
Plans will include substantial elements on improving investment climate and regulatory 
convergence with EU acquis’ (2012b, 11). Thus, decisions committing to economic reform, 
for example in the liberalisation of domestic markets and the mutual lowering of trade tariffs 
in trade relations with the EU, are made in the absence of a democratic mandate. When 
considering countries that do not meet EU democratic standards, the economic goals of the 
ENP are thus at odds with the democratic goals of the ENP. In this sense, the ENP is ‘spitting 
in the wind’ by promoting conflicting goals.
2.3. Spitting in the wind: contradictory incentives
Not only are the goals the ENP pursues contradictory, the way that the EU incentivises ENP 
goals is also in conflict with the goal of democracy promotion. The ENP offers enhanced 
economic integration and preferential access to EU markets as an incentive, but these incen-
tives come with conditions attached. Specifically, neighbourhood countries wanting to 
‘benefit’ from trade ‘incentives’ are required to adopt (elements of ) the EU regulatory frame-
work known as the acquis communautaire. These economic reforms are incoherent with the 
democracy promotion goal of self-government The 2011 joint communication, for example, 
references free trade agreements as incentives, but specifies that ‘beyond the mere elimi-
nation of import duties, these agreements should foster, in a progressive manner, closer 
integration between the economies of our Southern Mediterranean partners and the EU 
single market and would include actions such as regulatory convergence’ (9).
Convergence could entail two parties mutually moving to bring their trade relations 
together, but attention to the progress reports demonstrates that this is not the case. The 
2013 report for Southern Partners boasts that ‘New ENP Action Plans include substantial 
sections on improving the investment climate and regulatory convergence with the EU acquis’ 
(2014b, 12 my emphasis). What is required and expected is clearly that partner countries 
reform their regulatory frameworks to EU standards (see also 2014a). The 2012 regional 
report for the Eastern Partnership even warns:
to meet the EaP Roadmap objectives by the end of 2013, partner countries will need to give 
clear priority to measures to harmonising their rules with the EU acquis … On the EU side, all 
appropriate bilateral and multilateral fora and financial instruments will be used to support 
partner countries in this endeavour. (2013c, 15)
Requiring specific economic reforms in order to ‘qualify’ for economic incentives imposes a 
particular and partisan agenda on neighbourhood countries. I call this ‘conditional economic 
conditionality’ because not only is the economic benefit granted conditional on progress 
towards ENP goals, it is also granted conditional to economic reforms. Under conditional 
economic conditionality, ‘economic’ indicates both the area in which reform is desired and 
the way in which reform is incentivised.
Some may respond by saying that there is no requirement for neighbour countries to sign 
these association agreements, nor the proposed deep and comprehensive free trade agree-
ments. The economic ‘benefits’ of free trade and further integration into the EU economic 
model can only function as incentives if partner countries perceive that something desirable 
is in fact being offered. To the extent that this is not the case, countries can merely opt out 
of such associations, as was the case, for instance, when Armenia refused to sign the 
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negotiated Association Agreement in 2013 (Kostanyan 2015). This argument, however, mis-
understands the point this paper makes.
As before, the issue is not whether free trade agreements and economic integration with 
the EU are (un)desirable, but rather whether those agreeing to these associations themselves 
stand on a solid democratic mandate. Incentivising partner countries to adopt controversial 
economic policies – that can involve serious costs for some – undermines the notion that 
the ENP is designed to facilitate democracy promotion. A decision taken by a regime whose 
democratic credentials are seriously deficient, either not to associate with the EU, or to 
associate and move towards free trade and integrated markets, cannot therefore further 
democratisation efforts.
Even if the partner country did fully live up to the democratic standards ENP discourse 
claims to promote, conditional economic conditionality does little to promote the pluralistic, 
competitive democratic culture the ENP declares support for. Consider a partner country 
that chooses to freely trade with the EU and signs a DCFTA with a legitimate democratic 
mandate and under full knowledge that the costs involved are significant. Despite the ENP 
rhetoric of partnership and equal status, such a partner is in reality forced to choose between 
two options: the DCFTA, with unilateral convergence to EU regulatory norms on their part 
and the costs and benefits that are entailed (presumably more expected benefits than costs), 
or no trade agreement with the associated costs and benefits of that choice. This choice is 
‘free’ in the sense that it is unforced, but the structural inequalities between the EU’s and 
some neighbouring states’ economies is so vast that real freedom is surely limited. Reducing 
partner countries’ choices in this way undermines stated ENP commitments to democratic 
pluralism (2003, 7, also 2009; 2011b, 2013b).
This last point also suggests a standard for which the normative implications of this argu-
ment can be tested with regard to specific ENP partner countries and regions. The further a 
partner country is from the democratic standards that the EU professes to support, and the 
greater the economic inequalities between the EU and a partner country, the more significant 
the normative contradiction will be. This is especially salient considering the finding of Wetzel 
and Orbie’s edited volume The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion, that the EU’s power in 
bilateral relationships with partner countries increases as a function of economic disparities 
between the EU and any particular partner country (2015). These disparities are, on the 
whole, quite large. In Eastern Partnership countries, we see that the GDP per capita (PPP) is 
$11,097.74 compared to an EU wide figure estimated at $36,900.5 For the remaining countries 
in the ENP, which are also in the Union for the Mediterranean, the GDP per capita (PPP) is 
$15,308.2, which falls to $12,680.3 if we disregard Israel, an outlier both on this indicator and 
on democratic performance6 (for differences in EU democracy promotion see Browning & 
Joenniemi 2008).
On democratic indicators, there is also considerable divergence between the countries 
in the ENP. Three countries of the fifteen are ranked by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
2015 Democracy Index as democracies (Israel, Tunisia and Moldova). On the other end of 
the spectrum, this index ranks Libya, Azerbaijan, Egypt and Belarus as among the least 
democratic countries in the world (ranked 153rd, 149th, 134th and 127th, respectively). 
Comparing the Eastern Partnership countries and the Mediterranean countries of the ENP, 
we see that the average ranking is both rather low (103.125 for the Mediterranean region 
countries and 105.33 for the Eastern partnership). While firm conclusions about the effects 
of democratic indicators in EU partner countries on democracy promotion efforts require 
10   T. THEUNS
both empirical study and a critical engagement with the methodology of the index used, 
these rankings do indicate that the theoretical argument forwarded here has both range 
and scope among ENP countries. Concerns about partner countries lacking a sufficient dem-
ocratic mandate to bind their populations to a reform agenda seem a priori warranted.
3. ‘Simple transfers’ and ‘No Integration Without Incorporation’
Part two argued that conflicting goals and problematic incentives rendered ENP democracy 
promotion normatively and practically contradictory. This last part proposes solutions to 
this contradiction. Specifically, the two characteristics that undermine democracy promotion 
– namely, conflicting goals and problematic incentives – offer us two avenues for addressing 
the problem: reducing the ENP so that either of the conflicting goals are not pursued, and 
ensuring that ENP incentives do not require politically contested reforms in partner countries 
that do not meet threshold democratic standards. It is also suggested that the offer of EU 
membership changes the normative evaluation in important ways, potentially dissolving 
the normative contradiction. This suggests a normative argument for enlargement politics 
in the context of democracy promotion that seems to complement pragmatic arguments 
for offering eventual membership as a way of increasing ENP incentives and, as a conse-
quence, ENP effectiveness (Haukkala 2008).
Aside from the possibility of withdrawing democracy promotion efforts in the neighbour-
hood, which this paper does not discuss, these three avenues exhaust all avenues for resolv-
ing the contradiction described above. That is not to say that any of these options seems 
likely. The above section has argued that it is not possible to achieve both of two disparate 
goals: democracy promotion and market integration and liberalisation. While undermining 
the possibility of real progress on democracy promotion in the neighbourhood, the muddled 
approach currently taken does offer political benefits. It enables the Commission to pursue 
economic integration without much political risk – governance beyond borders – while also 
giving the appearance, often no doubt created in good faith, that ‘normative’ goals such as 
democracy promotion are central to the ENP.
The arguments of part two apply primarily to partner states that are not (fully) democratic. 
If the ENP were to lexically prioritise democracy promotion for the states that do not live up 
to minimal standards of pluralist democracy, and would only move on to other, more sub-
stantive goals after this is secured, then those deciding whether or not to promote ENP goals 
for their country would at least have a firm democratic mandate. This is not to say that 
non-democratic countries ought to be economically isolated. The use of economic sanctions 
as tools of diplomacy is serious and sometimes counterproductive; they should only be used 
where warranted and effective. The argument is rather that promoting market liberalisation 
and economic integration with non-democratic partner countries undermines the pluralist 
democracy that the EU claims in the ENP to promote. The argument also relies on democratic 
sequencing – the idea that democratic institutions must be delayed until the appropriate 
external conditions are in place – indeed being fallacious, as Thomas Carothers suggests 
(2007), and as Michelle Pace has developed in the context of EU democracy promotion in 
the MENA region (2009, 42–45). Prioritising democratisation lexically would not solve all the 
problems this paper has explored; if the ENP would pursue option-diminishing ‘conditional 
economic conditionality’ on expectations of unilateral regulatory convergence on the part 
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  11
of the partner, then it would not be effectively promoting democratic pluralism, even in a 
partner state that already enjoys adequately pluralistic democratic institutions.
A second approach to dissolving the normative dilemma posed by conflicting goals 
focuses on reforming the policy in order to abandon one of the conflicting goals. If the EU 
would pursue only democracy promotion, then – presuming success – neighbour countries 
would be free to settle the other aspects of their economic, trade and monetary policies 
(e.g.) in a democratic fashion. It may seem a high price for the EU to pay to pursue democracy 
in its neighbourhood potentially at the cost of other substantially desirable ends. Indeed, 
Voltolini and Bicchi have shown that the EU is unwilling to make this trade-off when security 
interests are at stake (2015). Even in less contentious domains, it may be asked why the EU 
would pursue such a policy. Two answers suggest themselves: the decision could be political 
– the promotion of democracy may prove to be a more important goal for EU citizens than 
market integration and trade liberalisation with neighbouring states, even if this involves 
costs. Alternatively, it may be argued that in the long run the democratisation of neighbour-
ing states is more in the EU’s interests than short-term gains from market liberalisation and 
economic integration.
Conflicting ENP incentives can be addressed in a similar fashion as with conflicting goals. 
The problem with EU trade incentives is that they come with conditions attached – the 
adoption of the acquis communautaire in the case of partner countries’ (partial) integration 
into the common market, and the lowering of their own tariffs in the agreement of DCFTAs. 
One solution is to detach these conditions – an approach that could be referred to as ‘simple 
benefits’. Here, the goals of the ENP would be incentivised by economic conditionality, but 
without imposing further peripheral conditions on the receipt of these benefits (i.e. getting 
rid of ‘conditional economic conditionality’). Some of the benefits the EU currently offers as 
incentives would not be available on such a strategy. For instance, partner countries that do 
not meet minimal democratic standards may not able to integrate with the EU internal 
market, because those bearing the costs of such integration would not be consulted via the 
democratic process, thus undermining the ENP’s commitment to pluralistic democracy.
Simple benefits also need not be taken to mean mere transfers of wealth (though that 
would be simplest). Trade benefits could also be granted unilaterally, with the EU lowering 
or dissolving tariffs with no requirement of reciprocity. Such a move is already pre-empted 
to a limited degree in what the EU refers to as ‘asymmetric liberalization’ – the granting of 
more beneficial tariff reductions (e.g.) to partner countries than the EU demands of them. 
However, whenever any such conditions are imposed, there are potential losers and a political 
debate that ought, according to the democratic norms the ENP declares allegiance, to be 
decided in a democratic fashion.
As a final point, it is interesting to consider EU relations with its neighbourhood prior 
to ‘enlargement exhaustion’. Contrasting acceding countries to the EU (who had to adopt 
the full acquis communautaire) with ENP partner countries shows another significant dif-
ference: acceding countries held popular referendums where the people were able to 
express their collective will as to the trade-off (wide-ranging, EU dictated reform and EU 
membership, or no reform and no membership); partner countries hold no such referen-
dums on the imposition of EU dictated standards and regulations. The democratic foun-
dation of the legitimacy of association with the EU was enhanced in the case of acceding 
countries vis-à-vis ENP partner countries. The two criteria of liberal political pluralism – 
competition between competing political visions and democratic control – are both 
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furthered through such referendums. While referendums are open to manipulation by 
elites, when compared to unilateral decisions by elites, they do permit a clearly enhanced 
scope for competitive discursive politics. Similarly, when EU association agreements by 
partner countries in the ENP are negotiated by elites without a democratic check, there is 
less scope for popular control over EU partner relations than was the case with acceding 
countries.
Furthermore, the offer of membership seems to disrupt the normative contradiction 
described above. The critique trades on the tension between giving up democratic control 
and autonomy over certain key policy areas – centrally the regulation of the economy – as 
a condition for receiving financial assistance and access to markets, to the end of, inter alia, 
democratisation. However, acceding countries thereby gained an equal stake in the EU leg-
islative and regulatory system, which is denied to ENP partner countries. Inclusion into the 
EU decision-making apparatus as equal members essentially created a new democratic space 
for those candidate countries’ self-government. The loss of autonomy that acceding countries 
experiences was therefore not a straightforward loss of control. New member states counts 
equally in the (democratic) procedures of EU governance. We ought therefore to speak in 
this case of a reciprocal transfer of democratic authority. One can call this strategy of resolving 
the normative contradiction ‘No Integration Without Incorporation’.
It is not insignificant that acceding states give up some of their democratic autonomy 
reciprocally when integration and incorporation converge. The acquis is an organic body of 
regulation, evolving to suit changing circumstances and political preferences. As a member 
state of the EU, new member states have a legally equal share in the decision-making pro-
cesses of EU law. They are, as all other states, granted a commissioner, a judge in the ECJ, a 
seat in the European Council, parliamentarians in the EP relative to their total population, 
etc. The loss of democratic autonomy entailed by joining the EU is a loss that is mutually 
self-imposed, in an inter-member relationship founded on equality – at least in some 
respects.
The above ought not to be taken to say that there is no digression in democratic autonomy 
for countries acceding to the European Union. For a start, many of the points of critique 
applied above apply; acceding states were under a much more extensive pressure to adopt 
the European acquis, for instance. Enlargement criteria can be option-diminishing in very 
serious ways potentially undermining democratic pluralism. While incorporation does disrupt 
the normative contradiction undermining democracy promotion efforts, it does not remove 
it entirely. Democratic incorporation does not, in other words, licence or legitimate all types 
of policy transfer, especially where costs are high or integration criteria very monolithic 
(Blokker 2013). However, within limits – no doubt difficult to determine – that are drawn 
from the pluralist liberal standards of democratic politics the EU is committed to, the possi-
bility of incorporation could provide a more solid normative foundation for democracy pro-
motion efforts.
When considering whether incorporation is option-diminishing in ways that are detri-
mental to pluralistic democracy it is not enough to consider if the conditions themselves 
are option-diminishing; this question ought to be asked of membership in the new polity 
also. One must heed a warning classical in democratic theory that increasing the size of a 
democratic polity decreases the influence of each voter on the outcomes of democratic 
processes. However, there is a trade-off possible between losses in the share of democratic 
power and gains in the total power of a democratic polity. Dahl and Tufte make this argument 
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  13
in their book Size and Democracy (1973). The idea is that while the smaller a democratic polity 
is the more citizens’ share of the power will be (and subsequently their engagement will be 
more constructive), the larger a polity is (and the more resources it commands) the better 
it will be able to accommodate citizen preferences. Of course, to really test this theory to the 
changes in democratic power for acceding states empirical research is necessary to track 
new EU member states’ abilities to secure citizen preferences, and it seems likely that results 
will vary between acceding states, but nevertheless this general observation does suggest 
that incorporating involves democratic gains and not only losses and is thus not necessarily 
option-diminishing.
One important point against these solutions is that the political will to pursue them does 
not (sufficiently) exist; in this way these proposals may be charged with being unfeasible. 
This critique can be related to a debate in political philosophy regarding how concessive (to 
circumstances) normative theory ought to be. One could (in a utopian fashion) argue that 
normative theory should be purely about what ought to be done, with no regard for what 
is likely to happen. The other, concessive, side of the spectrum regards all principles as 
empirical facts to be studied and seeks to avoid any normative conclusion or ‘moralism’. Most 
political philosophy lies on the spectrum between these utopian and concessive poles; for 
instance, while a utopian theory might demand pacifism, and a concessive theory explain 
the strategic value of war, most work in the ethics of war supposes that war, while tragic, is 
sometimes necessary. It is in this ‘non-ideal’ theoretic space that the limits and demands of 
ethical warfare are articulated.
The imminent critique approach that this paper has taken is distinct from utopianism 
or the concessive approach as it draws its normative conditions from empirical political 
practice (the discursive practice of EU democracy promotion), holding those principles 
up to standards of internal consistency. This approach is situated in the recent methodo-
logical turn in normative political theory towards ‘political realism’. The critique regarding 
feasibility should be taken in the light of this. In order to be consistent, the EU must pri-
oritise either democratisation or economic integration with neighbouring states since one 
can come at the cost of the other. This is not only a matter of theoretical consistency. The 
ENP in its current form necessarily undermines its democracy promotion efforts through 
conditional economic conditionality and the promotion of economic integration without 
incorporation. The choice then is simple: the ENP must either rebalance towards democ-
ratisation or economic integration, recognising that it cannot do both, or enlargement 
must be reintroduced as a way of legitimately pursuing both aspects simultaneously. The 
fact the EU must choose between these options is not unfeasible. What is unfeasible is the 
EU promoting democracy in the neighbourhood through the ENP as it is currently 
formulated.
The democratic legitimacy of enlargement conditionality was normatively different, and 
seems less problematic, than the legitimacy of ENP conditionality. Putting membership back 
on the table as an eventual possibility for ENP partner countries may enable the EU to con-
tinue to promote its agenda in the neighbourhood without undermining democracy pro-
motion. This is not to say that this avenue is a likely solution. There are important political 
considerations weighing against the likelihood of further expansion. Still, this paper has 
offered an argument why future expansion should not be dismissed by those committed to 
democracy promotion. Haukkala has argued that ‘the continuation of enlargement(s) … 
seems to be the only avenue through which the Union can project its normative power in 
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a legitimate and efficient manner in Europe’ (Haukkala 2008, 1617). With many in the litera-
ture arguing that the lack of a membership perspective is a core reason that ENP successes 
have been moderate, a normative argument on these lines give further reasons that enlarge-
ment ought to be reconsidered.
Notes
1.  While engaging ‘legitimation discourses’, centrally EU policy documents, this paper does not, 
however, use discourse analysis as a formal tool. For an evaluation of EU democracy promotion 
using this method, see Teti 2012.
2.  Some scholars of the substance of EU democracy promotion have noted this tendency 
empirically. For instance, Voltolini and Bicchi argue that security concerns ‘trump’ democracy 
promotion in Israel and Palestine (2015, see also Pace 2009). The argument of this paper, following 
the discourse, is focused on the tension between economic and trade-related reform goals and 
democracy promotion. A similar point in the context of EU internal economic policy has been 
made by Crum (2013) and regarding governance and democracy by Hazenberg (2013). At the 
level of theory, however, the argument of this paper is applicable to conditionality generally 
– the pursuit of substantive ends is ordinarily in tension with the promotion of democracy 
– a type of governing regime that is open-ended in principle (again, the paper argues that 
enlargement politics were an exception to this rule). The author thanks an anonymous reviewer 
for the Journal of European Integration for highlighting this point.
3.  Later reports also show a more communal side, for instance, when the 2012 regional report 
for Southern partners introduces the idea of a ‘democratic culture’ (2013b, 2) and ‘democratic 
dialogue’ (ibid., 16); the 2014 financial regulation continues on this foot with its desire to build 
‘democratic societies’ (Regulation (EU) No 232/2014, preamble 4).
4.  Calculated using 2014 figures from the World Bank available at: http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD (1 May 2016).
5.  CIA estimate for 2014 available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2004.html (1 May 2016).
6.  Israel’s per capita GDP was $33,703.4 in 2014, almost double the figure for Bulgaria, the poorest 
EU member state at $17,207.6. The next richest country in the ENP on this measure is Belarus 
at $18,184.9. On the Economist Intelligence Unit’s ‘Democracy Index’ of 2015, Israel ranks at 
34 globally, above EU states. The next highest ranked ENP country is Tunisia at 57, below the 
lowest ranked EU state which is Hungary at 54.
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